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Abstract
This paper uses the EAGLE, a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model, to illustrate
dynamic adjustments in a small open economy undergoing real convergence. We consider the eﬀects
of productivity catch-up and misperceptions about future productivity developments. Our results
indicate that even if real convergence takes the form of a gradual process, the dynamic responses
of key macrovariables can be far from smooth. We also ﬁnd that overly optimistic expectations
about productivity shifts can generate sizable boom-bust cycles and so be relevant in accounting
for cyclical deviations from a sustainable real convergence path. Our comparisons across alternative
monetary regimes reveal that a ﬂexible exchange rate helps to smooth real convergence processes
and misperceptions associated with tradable sector productivity, while the opposite usually holds
true for scenarios based on nontradable sector developments.
Keywords: Real convergence; Boom-bust cycles; Dynamic general equilibrium models.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D58; E32; F41.5
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Non-technical summary
The world history is full of episodes of long- and medium-term shifts in countries’ income per capita
positions. This is also true for a relatively homogeneous and developed club of EU economies. Even
within the euro area, as suggested by substantial diversity in past growth performance and still persisting
diﬀerences in per capita output across its member states, the currently observed and possible future
macroeconomic asymmetries cannot be attributed only to cyclical factors.
In this paper, we use the EAGLE model, recently developed by the staﬀ from the ECB, the Bank of
Italy and the Bank of Portugal in the context of the ESCB working group (see Gomes et al., 2010), to
analyze possible dynamic adjustments in a relatively small open economy undergoing real convergence
processes. We focus our calibration around the Spanish economy. Using the four-country setup of
EAGLE, we link it not only to the rest of the euro area, but also to the US and the rest of the world.
The choice of Spain is motivated by the fact that this country’s productivity relatively to the rest of
the euro area has been far from stable over the last decades, with rapid catching-up in the 1970s and
most of 1980s followed by years of marked divergence. At the same time, it has to be stressed that
singling out Spain serves only illustrative purposes and our main goal is certainly not to describe actual
past developments in this country. Instead, the analysis oﬀered in this paper is aimed to be more
general, relevant for any small (current or prospective) member of a monetary union, and the euro area
in particular.
Apart from highlighting the real convergence mechanics in a fully-ﬂedged multi-country dynamic
general equilibrium setup, we also demonstrate how misperceptions about productivity shifts may con-
tribute to signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic variables. We do so by considering situations in
which the economic agents in our analyzed economy treat a temporary shift in productivity as a perma-
nent one or are faced with optimistic but false news about future productivity developments. Several
papers have incorporated confusion about the nature (e.g. persistence) of productivity shocks into
micro-founded macroeconomic models (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2008; Fujiwara et al., 2008; Chris-
tiano et al., 2008). However, these studies are based on closed-economy setups, so they neglect channels
arising from international linkages, which may be particularly important for relatively open current and
prospective euro area members. Also, most of earlier contributions consider ﬂuctuations in productivity
(expected or unexpected) that are only transitory in nature. We argue that in the case of a catching-up
economy, confusing temporary and permanent shocks or illusions about future permanent productivity
improvements might be a more relevant description of reality.
Finally, we show how the dynamic responses to all these scenarios are shaped by a monetary policy
regime. More speciﬁcally, we compare our baseline results to a fully ﬂoating exchange rate regime. In
this respect, our paper is related to a recent work by Karam et al. (2008), who use the GEM to assess
the costs and beneﬁts of adopting the euro by a small emerging economy. However, the focus of their
contribution are short-run adjustments to a relatively standard set of transitory shocks rather than to
long-run processes or misperceptions discussed in this paper.
Our main results indicate that even if real convergence takes the form of a gradual process, the
dynamic responses of key macrovariables may be far from smooth. It follows that they can be easily
misinterpreted as manifestations of growing imbalances requiring policy intervention, while, at least
from the model perspective, they are just optimal responses of the private sector, given the monetary6
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and ﬁscal feedback rules. We also ﬁnd that misperceptions about permanent shifts in productivity
can generate sizable boom-bust cycles and so can be relevant in accounting for cyclical deviations
from a sustainable real convergence path.
that a ﬂexible exchange rate helps to smooth real convergence processes and misperceptions associated
with tradable sector productivity. This eﬀect is particularly strong for inﬂation, non-negligible but
substantially weaker for output, consumption and investment, while the current account position is
hardly aﬀected. In contrast, the free ﬂoat usually generates more volatility in scenarios based on
nontradable sector productivity developments.
A comparison across alternative monetary regimes reveals7
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1 Introduction
The world history is full of episodes of long- and medium-term shifts in countries’ income per capita
positions. This is also true for a relatively homogeneous and developed club of EU economies. Even
within the euro area, as suggested by substantial diversity in past growth performance and still persisting
diﬀerences in per capita output across its member states, the currently observed and possible future
macroeconomic asymmetries cannot be attributed only to cyclical factors.
In recent years, an increasing number of cross-country studies have been based on micro-founded
multi-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, incorporating nominal and real
rigidities suﬃcient to yield a reasonable empirical ﬁt. While the early attempts usually used models
designed to analyze only the cyclical properties of the data,1 recent advances in constructing large and
relatively comprehensive DSGE models have made it possible to construct more sophisticated scenarios,
including changes in parameters aﬀecting the selected long-run characteristics of the modelled economies.
Two important projects in this area are the Global Economic Model (GEM) maintained at the IMF
(see Laxton and Pesenti, 2003) and the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) constructed at the ECB (see
Coenen et al., 2008a). These models and their oﬀspring have been used in a variety of applications,
including scenarios of global current account rebalancing (Faruqee et al., 2005), labour tax reforms
(Coenen et al., 2008a), ﬁscal consolidation (Coenen et al., 2008b), structural reforms (Everaert and
Schule, 2006) or globalization (Jacquinot and Straub, 2008).
In this paper, we use the EAGLE model, recently developed by the staﬀ from the ECB, the Bank of
Italy and the Bank of Portugal in the context of the ESCB working group (see Gomes et al., 2010), to
analyze possible dynamic adjustments in a relatively small open economy undergoing real convergence
processes. We focus our calibration around the Spanish economy. Using the four-country setup of
EAGLE, we link it not only to the rest of the euro area, but also to the US and the rest of the world. It
has to be stressed that singling out Spain serves only illustrative purposes and our main goal is certainly
not to describe actual past developments in this country. Instead, the analysis oﬀered in this paper is
aimed to be more general, relevant for any small (current or prospective) member of a monetary union,
and the euro area in particular.
We deﬁne real convergence as productivity catch-up. While there is probably no need to argue
that this kind of long- and medium-term processes is highly relevant for a number of small economies,
including current and deﬁnitely most of prospective euro area members, we brieﬂy illustrate our case
by referring to the past Spanish experience. As can be seen from Figure 1, Spain’s productivity relative
to the rest of the euro area has been far from stable over the last thirty-ﬁve years. Two distinct periods
stand out. During the ﬁrst one, spanning over the 1970s and most of the 1980s, rapid and sustained
catching-up brought the Spanish tradable sector productivity to the average level observed in the rest
of the club. Around early 1990s, however, real divergence set oﬀ and by now most of the previously
accumulated gains have been reversed. Interestingly, ﬂuctuations in the productivity gap calculated for
the nontradable industries contributed substantially less to the medium and long-term shifts in Spain’s
position relative to the rest of the euro area.
This simple illustration clearly suggests that long- and medium-term processes can play an important
1For instance, building on a closed-economy setup of Smets and Wouters (2003), de Walque et al. (2005) estimate a
two-country model linking the euro area and the US.8
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role in accounting for asymmetric developments within the common currency area. Therefore, examining
how a catching-up (or falling behind) economy might respond to such scenarios seems to be highly
relevant for understanding the nature and sustainability of the observed divergences within the euro
area.2 Needless to say, this kind of developments will become even more relevant with the euro being
adopted by the relatively poor EU member states from the ex-communist block.
Apart from highlighting the real convergence mechanics in a fully-ﬂedged multi-country DSGE setup,
we also demonstrate how misperceptions about productivity shifts may contribute to signiﬁcant ﬂuctu-
ations in macroeconomic variables. We do so by considering situations in which the economic agents
in our analyzed economy treat a temporary shift in productivity as a permanent one or are faced with
optimistic but false news about future productivity developments. As pointed out by Collard et al.
(2008), the idea of incorporating confusion about the nature (e.g. persistence) of productivity shocks
into micro-founded macroeconomic models can be traced back to the seminal contribution by Kydland
and Prescott (1982). At least since the work by Orphanides (2003) it is well known that this kind of mis-
perceptions may be quite substantial and aﬀect the eﬃcient policy conduct even in relatively developed
economies. The importance of true news shocks to aggregate ﬂuctuations has been recently established
by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) or Fujiwara et al. (2008), while Christiano et al. (2008) consider a
false news shock and demonstrate how it may generate boom-bust cycles. These papers, however, are
based on closed-economy models, so they neglect channels arising from international linkages, which are
particularly important for relatively open current and prospective euro area members. Also, the earlier
contributions consider ﬂuctuations in productivity (expected or unexpected) that are only transitory in
nature. We argue that in the case of a catching-up economy, confusing temporary and permanent shocks
or illusions about future permanent productivity improvements might be a more relevant description of
reality.
Finally, we show how the dynamic responses to all these scenarios are shaped by a monetary policy
regime. More speciﬁcally, we compare our baseline results to a fully ﬂoating exchange rate regime. In
this respect, our paper is related to a recent work by Karam et al. (2008), who use the GEM to assess
the costs and beneﬁts of adopting the euro by a small emerging economy. However, the focus of their
contribution are short-run adjustments to a relatively standard set of transitory shocks rather than to
long-run processes or misperceptions discussed in this paper.
Our main results indicate that even if real convergence takes the form of a gradual process, the
dynamic responses of key macrovariables may be far from smooth. It follows that they can be easily
misinterpreted as manifestations of growing imbalances requiring policy intervention, while, at least
from the model perspective, they are just optimal responses of the private sector, given the monetary
and ﬁscal feedback rules. We also ﬁnd that misperceptions about permanent shifts in productivity
can generate sizable boom-bust cycles and so can be relevant in accounting for cyclical deviations
from a sustainable real convergence path.
that a ﬂexible exchange rate helps to smooth real convergence processes and misperceptions associated
with tradable sector productivity. This eﬀect is particularly strong for inﬂation, non-negligible but
2Clearly, productivity developments are not the only plausible sources of real convergence or divergence within the
euro area. For instance, Gomes et al. (2008) demonstrate that structural reforms increasing competition on labour and
product markets may also lead to sizable changes in output per capita across countries. It is worth noting that although
productivity and the intensity of competition are assumed to be independent exogenous parameters in the EAGLE model,
they may be interrelated in reality. Analyzing these kinds of interdependencies is however beyond the scope of this study.
A comparison across alternative monetary regimes reveals9
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1231
August 2010
substantially weaker for output, consumption and investment, while the current account position is
hardly aﬀected. In contrast, the free ﬂoat usually generates more volatility in scenarios based on
nontradable sector productivity developments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief overview of the EAGLE
model. Its parameterization and calibration is discussed in section three. Section four deﬁnes and
presents the real convergence scenarios. An illustration of possible misperceptions along the convergence
path is presented in section ﬁve. Section six discusses the role of monetary regimes for the dynamic
responses in each of our scenarios. Section seven concludes.
2 Bird’s-eye view at EAGLE
The EAGLE (“Euro Area and GLobal Economy”) model is a relatively large and comprehensive DSGE
model, designed to cover four regions of the world economy, two of which constitute a monetary union.
The model structure builds largely on the NAWM, extending it in several dimensions.3 Below, we pro-
vide only a brief overview of the main features of EAGLE, referring the reader to the source documents
for details.
Except for the monetary policy regimes and some parameter values, each region covered in EAGLE
is modelled in a symmetric fashion. The economic areas are linked with each other by bilateral trade re-
lations and international ﬁnancial markets, assumed to be incomplete and so allowing for only imperfect
risk sharing across countries.
Each region is populated by two types of households, diﬀering in their ability to participate in asset
markets. One group of households can transfer its wealth intertemporally by holding money, trading
bonds and accumulating physical capital, while the only asset held by other households is money.
There is monopolistic competition on the labour market, so each household acts as a wage setter for its
diﬀerentiated labour service supplied to ﬁrms. Wage rigidities are modelled using the staggered contract
setup as in Calvo (1983), augmented with an indexation scheme to past and steady-state consumer price
inﬂation for those who cannot reoptimize.
There are two types of intermediate goods: nontradables and tradables. Each is produced by a
continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, using as inputs labour and capital services (allowing
for time-varying capacity utilization) supplied by households. Firms set prices of their diﬀerentiated
output according to the Calvo-type scheme with indexation. Tradable intermediate goods are subject
to international trade, with export prices denominated in the importing country’s currency.
Diﬀerent varieties of domestic and imported goods are aggregated by perfectly competitive ﬁnal
goods ﬁrms, operating at a country level. Aggregation of imports into a homogeneous import good is
subject to adjustment costs whenever the country trade structure changes. The ﬁnal consumption good
is produced by combining nontradables with a bundle of home-made tradables and imported goods.
The ﬁnal investment good is deﬁned in a similar manner, while the ﬁnal government good has only
nontradable content.
The ﬁscal authority levies both proportional and lump-sum taxes and earns seignorage on outstand-
ing money holdings. On the expenditure side, the government purchases ﬁnal goods and makes transfer
payments to households. Transfers and lump-sum taxes are not evenly distributed across the two types
3See Jacquinot and Straub (2008) for an intermediate stage between the NAWM and EAGLE.10
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of households, with those having full access to asset markets receiving less and paying more in per-capita
terms. The ﬁscal debt is held in form of government bonds and its long-term target level is achieved by
a smooth adjustment in lump-sum taxes.
There are three monetary authorities in the model, one deﬁned for the common currency area and
two for the remaining regions. All follow a Taylor-type interest rate feedback rule, speciﬁed in terms
of deviations of consumer price inﬂation and output from their target (steady-state) levels, allowing for
some interest rate smoothing.
3 Parameterization and calibration
We make one departure from the original EAGLE speciﬁcation described in Gomes et al. (2010). Rather
than assuming that the costs of varying capacity utilization have to be covered by a current ﬂow of
ﬁnal investment goods, we follow Greenwood et al. (1988) and specify these costs in the form of an
increase in capital depreciation. Using this apparently innocuous respeciﬁcation of the model, we can
allow for some (though limited if compared to the parameterization of the NAWM) variation in capacity
utilization and still obtain a realistic short-run response of investment to productivity shocks.4
The original version of EAGLE is calibrated to represent the following regions of the world economy:
Germany, the rest of the euro area, the United States and the rest of the world. Given the main focus
of our analysis, which is a relatively small and converging economy, we recalibrate the euro area block
in EAGLE to single out Spain rather than Germany. It has to be stressed that this choice does not
mean that we aim at ﬁtting exactly the model to the Spanish data (and its cyclical components in
particular). We want rather our analysis to be more general and relevant for any present or prospective
euro area member with a real convergence potential. Therefore, we keep many of the model parameters
symmetric across the four regions, even though making them heterogeneous could increase the overall
ﬁt of the model.
Our strategy to calibrate EAGLE can be divided into two standard stages. First, we pin down a
subset of parameters governing some key steady-state ratios, using their approximate empirical coun-
terparts.5 Next, we calibrate the remaining parameters of the model, drawing heavily on the original
version of EAGLE, which in turn can be traced back to the parameterization of the NAWM or the GEM,
as well as estimated small scale DSGE models for the euro area and the United States (e.g. Smets and
Wouters, 2003; Christiano et al., 2005; de Walque et al., 2005). The calibrated parameters for our four
regional blocks are reported in Tables 1 through 9. Below we provide a brief discussion of our main
choices and data sources.
3.1 Steady-state ratios
The relative size of each region is calibrated to reﬂect its GDP share in the world economy. Consistently
with the assumption that each region’s steady-state trade balance is zero, we set the nominal output
shares of consumption, government expenditures and investment to the respective domestic demand
4See Altig et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion on the relation between costs of varying capacity utilization and a
dynamic response of investment to a neutral technology shock.
5More precisely, some of the key steady-state ratios give us restrictions on the parameter space rather than ﬁxing them
unambiguously. Whenever relevant, these restrictions are observed in the second stage of calibration.11
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shares of private consumption, public consumption and gross capital formation. The data used are the
long-run averages and come from the national accounts statistics collected in the World Development
Indicators database.
To obtain a more recent picture of international trade relations, we set the total import share of
each region using the same data source, but averaged over a shorter sample. Since the model structure
does not account for imported intermediate inputs in exports, we correct total imports of each region
for the import content of exports, assumed at roughly 45%, consistently with estimates using input-
output tables for the euro area countries (see e.g. Bowles and Maurin, 2008). The structure of bilateral
trade ﬂows, including their ﬁnal use breakdown (consumption or investment), relies on ﬂows of goods
extracted from the CHELEM database and averaged over the years 2001-2005.6
The quasi-share7 of nontradables in the consumption and investment basket is set to 70% and
40%, respectively, which together with the assumption on fully nontradable content of government
expenditures implies the share of tradable output in GDP of about 30%. This number is roughly
consistent with the values implied by the share of agriculture, mining and manufacturing in total market
economy, calculated for Spain, the euro area and the United States using the EU-KLEMS database.
3.2 Other parameters
While parameterizing the production technology, we make the usual assumption that the nontradable
sector is more labour intensive than the tradable sector. We also take into account that investment
rates in Spain and the rest of the world are on average higher than in the euro area or in the US. In
line with these observations, we set the capital share in nontradable (tradable) production at 0.35 (0.4)
for the former two regions and at 0.3 (0.35) for the latter.
The price and wage mark-ups for Spain and the euro area are taken from Everaert and Schule (2006),
while those for the United States and the rest of the world come from Faruqee et al. (2005). These
estimates imply lower competition in the euro area region than in the rest of the global economy, both
on the labour and product markets.
For the euro area and the United States, the share of households with limited access to asset markets
is assumed to be 25%, in line with the estimates reported in Coenen and Straub (2005). For the
remaining two regions, this share is twice as high, which is aimed at capturing their lower ﬁnancial
development.
The tax structure for Spain, the rest of the euro area and the United States is taken directly from
Coenen et al. (2008a). Tax wedges for the rest of the world are calibrated at the US level. The capital
tax rate is treated as a free parameter and used to calibrate the region-speciﬁc investment shares in
output.
Most of the remaining key parameters are assumed to be the same across the four regions and
broadly consistent with the original version of EAGLE or the NAWM.
The elasticities of substitution used for aggregating various bundles of goods into ﬁnal consumption
goods are the same as those for ﬁnal investment goods. In particular, the elasticity of substitution
6We are aware of the fact that the trade matrices for goods and services may exhibit quite diﬀerent patterns. Unfor-
tunately, there is no bilateral trade data for services available for the regions included in our model.
7Whenever we talk about quasi-shares, we mean the share parameters in the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
aggregators. The quasi-shares coincide in the steady-state equilibrium with ”true” nominal shares as long as all relevant
relative prices are equal to one.12
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between nontradable goods and a bundle of domestic tradable and imported goods is set to 0.5, the
elasticity of substitution between home-made and imported tradable baskets is calibrated at 2, while
that governing substitutability across imports from diﬀerent countries is assumed to be equal to 1.3.
The Calvo probabilities on the labour and domestic product markets are set to 0.75, implying an
average time between wage and price reoptimization of four quarters. The degree of stickiness in the
ﬁrms’ export pricing decisions is assumed to be substantially lower (0.3). Indexation parameters are set
to 0.5 on the product market and 0.75 on the labour market.
The choices of adjustment cost parameters are taken directly from the NAWM. As discussed before,
an important exception is the cost of varying capacity utlization, which we assume to be relatively high.
The response of the share of lump-sum taxes in nominal output to deviations of the public debt-
to-output ratio from the target (60% on an annual basis) is set to 0.1. We also maintain the NAWM
assumption on asymmetric distribution of lump sum transfers and taxes across the two types of house-
holds, favouring those with limited access to capital markets in the proportion of 3 to 1.
Finally, the long-run monetary policy response to inﬂation and the output gap is calibrated at 2 and
0.25, respectively, while the weight on the lagged interest rate is set to 0.9.
4 Real convergence scenarios
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne our baseline scenarios and express them in terms of model variables,
parameters and assumptions. We next use the EAGLE model to inspect the response of the main
macroeconomic aggregates to each scenario.
While constructing our illustrative scenarios, we abstract away from any particular forces driving
the real convergence processes, i.e. they are treated as purely exogenous, consistently with the logic of
the model. We develop two alternative variants. In the ﬁrst one, which is our baseline, we assume that
once convergence kicks oﬀ, its whole future path is fully anticipated by all economic agents populating
our model world. In the second variant, we take the opposite stance on agents’ ability to anticipate
future shifts in productivity or foreign preferences, i.e. we let them be taken by surprise each period,
so that the whole convergence process can be seen as a series of permanent but unanticipated shocks.
Admittedly, our illustrations of real convergence are very stylized and the reality is far more compli-
cated. Still, we believe that considering and comparing across them provides a useful departure point
for a theoretical analysis of cross-country heterogeneity resulting from dynamic structural asymmetries.
A further discussion of possible disturbances along these deterministic and potentially smooth scenarios
is postponed to the next section.
4.1 Productivity catching-up
We base our main catching-up scenario on the sector producing tradable goods. This is motivated by
the common description of productivity convergence in the growth literature, based on the diﬀusion of
technological advances between R&D intensive industries, usually open to international trade. Such an
assumption also squares well with productivity developments in Spain discussed in the introduction and
also general real convergence patterns observed in the EU new member states (see e.g. Bijsterbosch and
Kolasa, 2010).13
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More speciﬁcally, we consider a scenario in which a small member of a currency union embarks on















where AT,t and A∗
T,t are the tradable sector total factor productivity (TFP) levels in the converging
economy and the (more developed) rest of the monetary union, respectively, and α is the parameter
controlling the speed of convergence. Equation (1) can be seen as the law of motion for the productivity
gap, deﬁned as the percentage diﬀerence between the current and target TFP, with the latter assumed
equal to that prevailing in more advanced economies. A useful feature of this speciﬁcation is that it
implies a declining proﬁle for the speed at which the technological gap is reduced, consistently with a
standard description of such processes (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997).
Importantly, we implement this scenario by allowing the steady-state of our workhorse model to
vary along and in line with the productivity convergence path. Given the structure of EAGLE, we
ﬁnd this formulation more realistic than the natural alternative, which is making the steady-state jump
immediately to its terminal level (i.e. to which the dynamic model solution converges only after the
catching-up process is completed). The main reason for it is because in EAGLE (as well as in the
NAWM) many ﬁscal policy variables (e.g. government expenditures, lump sum transfers and taxes) are
tied to steady-state nominal output. Hence, making the steady-state instantaneously reach its terminal
level would mean an abrupt increase in some state budget components, which seems neither realistic
nor desired given our focus on developments purely related to real convergence.
While calibrating the catching-up scenario, we set the initial diﬀerence between the current and
target TFP in the tradable sector to 11%, which is roughly consistent with Spain’s labour productivity
gap vis-a-vis the rest of the euro area of 17% observed in 2005 (see Figure 1).8 The speed of convergence
is calibrated at 0.05, implying that half of the gap between the current and target TFP level is eliminated
after about 14 quarters, while after 11 years the gap is reduced to just 1%.
The long-run (i.e. after the catch-up and all short-term adjustments have been completed) impact
of this scenario is presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 10.9 We can see that higher tradable sector
productivity leads to higher steady-state output not only in this sector, but also in the nontradable
sector, though naturally to a much lesser extent. Given higher tradable content, investment expands by
more than consumption. Higher productivity boosts international trade, with exports gaining in real
terms more than four times as much as imports. Since both the original and the new steady-state feature
a zero nominal trade balance,10 this expansion in export volume has to be oﬀset by a depreciation of
the terms of trade, i.e. an increase in import prices relative to export prices. Similarly, the new
equilibrium on the domestic market requires an increase in the internal real exchange rate, deﬁned as
the price of nontradables relative to the price of the domestically consumed tradable basket. In line
8This is just a stylized and mechanical approximation, calculated by simply correcting the labour productivity gap
for factor elasticities of output. Since such a calibration of the TFP gap neglects a number of intratemporal mechanisms
present in the model (e.g. intersectoral reallocations, changes in relative prices, consumption-leasure choice, international
spillovers), driving it to zero does not result in exact equalization of labour productivity across Spain and the euro area
in our model simulations presented below.
9By construction, the long-run eﬀects of all our convergence scenarios are identical across the anticipated and unan-
ticipated variants.
10We discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption in section 4.2.14
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with the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) eﬀect,11 the consumer-price-based external real exchange
rate appreciates. Due to a positive wealth eﬀect, labour supply declines, leading to a slight decrease
in total hours worked.12 Given the low size of the converging economy, international spillovers related
to this scenario are very limited. Output in the rest of the euro area basically does not move, while
consumption increases by a notch, following a favourable change in this region’s terms of trade. Spillovers
to the US and the rest of the world (not reported) are virtually zero.
The dynamic responses of the main macrovariables are plotted in Figure 2. Focusing ﬁrst on our
baseline variant (fully anticipated convergence - solid lines), we ﬁrst note that the responses in general
do not evolve as smoothly as the underlying productivity path described by equation (1). In particular,
investment shoots up and then is increasing at a somewhat slower rate. The initial reaction of private
consumption relative to its target level is very similar, but then it decelerates signiﬁcantly and approaches
its steady-state at a very low pace. Compared to domestic demand components, the expansion in total
output is relatively moderate and smooth, so the trade balance deteriorates. The size of the deﬁcit may
be considered as not very high (0.4% of output at the trough), but it is sustained for an extended period
of time, turning positive only after eight years, which is when about two-thirds of the convergence process
has been completed. Since a mounting foreign debt needs to be serviced, deterioration in the current
account is deeper and its negative balance lasts even longer. Interest paid on net foreign liabilities, which
at a trough reach nearly 10% of nominal GDP, is the main factor behind deceleration in consumption
discussed above. Increased demand pressures during the ﬁrst years after the shock push inﬂation up.
Since our economy is only a small part of the monetary union, nominal interest rates remain virtually
unchanged and the rise in inﬂation is quite substantial. Its deviation from the area-wide target falls
below 0.2 percentage points only after four years and stays above 0.1 for about a decade. An increased
inﬂation rate relative to the rest of the common currency area can be seen as a manifestation of the
HBS eﬀect and results in a strong appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Turning to our second variant of convergence (unanticipated catching-up - dashed lines), it is ap-
parent that it yields far smoother dynamic responses than our baseline. This is particularly true for
consumption, which, absent strong wealth eﬀects related to expectations about future income increases,
now evolves much more gradually. Consistently with a subdued initial expansion in domestic demand
components, the current account deteriorates less, while the peak response of inﬂation is halved and
postponed by two years compared to the baseline variant.
We have argued that productivity convergence based on the tradable sector provides a more realistic
description of a typical catching-up process. Still, at least for comparison, it might be useful to see how
the response of key macroaggregates would change if our lagging economy embarked on a convergence
path based on productivity gains in the nontradable sector.
The scenario is implemented in a similar fashion as the previous one, so the catching-up trajectory
evolves in an analogous way as represented by equation (1). We calibrate the initial diﬀerence between
the current and target nontradable sector TFP level at 4%, which corresponds to a half of Spain’s labour
productivity gap vis-a-vis the rest of the euro area observed in 2005 (equal to about 13%, see Figure 1).
As before, the speed of convergence is set to 0.05.
The long-run eﬀects are presented in the second column of Table 10. They conﬁrm the previous
11See Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964).
12This would not be the case if we assumed a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution.15
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observation that a sector speciﬁc productivity shock aﬀects output in both sectors in the same direction.
Looking at domestic demand components, one can see that a shift in nontradable sector productivity
raises consumption more than investment. This is the opposite to what we observed in the case of the
tradable sector productivity scenario and results from diﬀerences in the tradable-nontradable composi-
tion across these two ﬁnal goods. One can also note a much smaller than before eﬀect on foreign trade
volumes, even if one takes into account that the magnitude of shocks are not the same. The long-run
response of the internal and external real exchange rates are just the HBS eﬀect in reverse. A limited
expansion of exports over imports implies only a moderate depreciation of the terms of trade, which
makes the magnitude of spillovers to Spain’s trading partners virtually equal to zero. As before, the
wealth eﬀect decreases the labour supply.
The dynamic responses to the convergence scenario in the nontradable goods sector are illustrated
in Figure 3. Starting with our baseline variant, the most striking diﬀerence compared to the tradable
sector scenario is the initial decrease in investment, which is reversed only in the sixth year after the
shock. This fall is driven by the expected further rise in productivity (given its gradual rather than
instantaneous shift) and the corresponding postponement of investment.13 A similar mechanism is also
at work if productivity convergence is based on the tradable sector. In that case, however, it is more than
oﬀset by the expected appreciation of the real exchange rate, which encourages taking loans abroad.
The opposite holds true if real convergence relies on nontradable sector productivity gains, as in this
case the real exchange rate depreciates. Indeed, as can be seen from the response of the current account,
it actually improves and goes negative only after seven years. The same considerations also explain why
consumption does not increase as fast as in our previous scenario, but moves more smoothly towards its
target level.14 Consistently with the HBS eﬀect in reverse, productivity gains in the nontradable sector
lead to a fall in inﬂation, which does not die out completely for an extended period of time.
When the nontradable sector productivity catching-up is unanticipated, there is no reason to post-
pone investment, so its initial response is positive and the current account deteriorates. As in our
previous scenario, decreased wealth eﬀects lead to a slower increase in consumption. The peak response
of inﬂation is postponed by about a year, but its size is not very diﬀerent to the anticipated case.
4.2 Real convergence and shifts in international investment positions
Our real convergence scenarios assume that they do not lead to permanent changes in international
investment positions, i.e. each country’s net foreign assets to GDP ratios eventually go back to their
initial steady-state levels. Now we analyze how our results change if this restriction is relaxed.
More speciﬁcally, we assume thata1p e rc e n ti n c r ease in a converging economy’s steady-state GDP
per hours worked (in PPP terms) is associated with a deterioration in its steady-state international
investment position (relative to annual GDP) by 0.4 percentage points.15 A non-zero steady-state net
13See Jacquinot and Straub (2008) for a similar interpretation of this result.
14Another (though far less important) reason for a diﬀerent response of domestic demand to gradual productivity gains
in the tradable vs. nontradable sector is higher price ﬂexibility of the former. This results from our calibration, which
assumes that prices of exported goods are reoptimized more frequently than prices of goods sold domestically. See Gali
(1999) for an exposition of the relation between price stickiness and a dynamic response of hours worked (which can be
extended to factor inputs in general) to a permanent productivity shock.
15This is a very rough and only illustrative calibration, based on the observed relation between the initial output per
capita gap (around 60% if estimated in 1960 for Spain and in 1995 for the EU new member states) and the sustainable
external debt target (estimated at 53-65% of GDP for the relevant group of countries; see Bul´ ıˇ r and ˇ Sm´ ıdkov´ a, 2005). As it16
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foreign asset position is technically implemented as in Faruqee et al. (2005) and Coenen et al. (2008b),
i.e. by making ﬁnancial intermediation costs dependent on the deviation of the actual net holdings of
foreign assets from their desired (target) level rather than from zero. The new target net foreign assets
position is allowed to approach its terminal level in a gradual way (in line with equation (1)), with
the speed of convergence identical to that assumed for the exogenous productivity driving the relevant
scenario.
In the long run, a negative target international investment position generates additional expenditures
for domestic households in form of interest paid on foreign debt. Therefore, introducing this additional
channel can reduce the wealth eﬀects associated with real convergence. In the short run, however, a
decrease in the desired net foreign assets position makes running the current account deﬁcit less costly,
which facilitates a sharper response of domestic demand components to favourable shifts in productivity.
This intuition is conﬁrmed by our simulations.16 Indeed, allowing for permanent changes in net
foreign assets holdings results in a smaller long-run response of consumption and hours worked (but a
larger response of output) in the tradable sector productivity convergence scenario. It has to be noted,
however, that the diﬀerences are rather moderate, not exceeding 0.1 pp. for output. As regards the
dynamic responses, the long-run reduction in wealth eﬀects turns out to be more than oﬀset in the
short-run by a decrease in the costs of ﬁnancing the current account deﬁcit. As a result, consumption
and investment (and, though to a lesser degree, output) go up by more than in the baseline variant,
the current account deterioration is deeper and initial inﬂation pressures are higher. Contrary to the
long-run eﬀects, the short-run impact of allowing the target net foreign position to change are more
pronounced. For instance, the short-run (i.e. one-year after) response of consumption is now larger by
0.4 pp., while that of investment by 1.1 pp.
As regards the scenario based on nontradable sector productivity developments, its results do not
diﬀer from those presented before. This is because the observed increase in Spain’s (real) labour produc-
tivity is oﬀset by the real exchange rate depreciation. Given the assumption underlying the simulations
presented in this section, as nominal GDP per hours worked remains unchanged, so does the target net
foreign assets position.
5 Misperceptions along the convergence path
We have seen in the previous section that even smooth processes, like gradual productivity catching-up,
do not necessarily result in smooth dynamic responses of the main macrovariables. Therefore, without
knowing the underlying forces, such developments could be easily misinterpreted as manifestations of
growing imbalances, requiring policy intervention to avoid huge boom-bust swings, while in fact they are
just optimal (at least from the model perspective) responses of the private sector, given the monetary
and ﬁscal policy feedback rules.17
is well known, there are various patterns of real convergence with respect to changes in international investment positions.
For instance, China’s catching-up is accompanied by accumulation and not decumulation of net foreign assets. Therefore,
this additional variant can be viewed as just a sensitivity check for one of the simplifying assumptions underlying the
scenarios presented before.
16The results are available from the author upon request.
17It has to be noted that the policy rules assumed in the model are rather mechanical and uncontingent on the underlying
shocks. Therefore, the dynamic responses of macroaggregates could be diﬀerent if the policy (and the ﬁscal policy in
particular) was tailored to the speciﬁc convergence scenario. This kind of considerations is left for future research.17
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On the other hand, real convergence processes are obviously far more complicated than suggested
by the stylized scenarios set up above. In particular, their driving forces are to a large extent neither
smooth nor deterministic. Transitory productivity shocks coexist with permanent shifts and it may be
diﬃcult to distinguish between them straight after they hit the economy. In this section we demonstrate
how such misperceptions can generate sizable boom-bust cycles.
We consider two misperceptions scenarios. The ﬁrst is based on confusing a temporary produc-
tivity shift with a permanent one. The second scenario concerns optimistic expectations about future
productivity, which however fail to materialize.
We deﬁne the ﬁrst misperception scenario as a temporary shift in tradable sector productivity, which
rises by 1% and comes back to its original level after two years. However, once the shock hits, it is
perceived as permanent and only after it unwinds do the agents realize its true nature.
The dynamic response of selected variables to such a scenario is illustrated in Figure 4 (solid line),
along with the response to a truly permanent productivity shift (dashed line). If agents are faced with a
shock that is perceived as permanent, the economic activity increases, with output and investment even
overshooting the new steady-state. The current account deteriorates, the real exchange rate appreciates
and inﬂation rises. Once it becomes clear that the shock is only temporary, the optimal plans of economic
agents have to be substantially revised. Consequently, output and domestic demand contract sharply,
falling below their initial levels within a year. A nearly instantaneous improvement in the current
account balance resembles a ”sudden stop”. Inﬂation falls sharply and quickly turns into deﬂation. As
a result, the real exchange rate depreciates.
In the second misperception scenario, the economic agents receive news, according to which tradable
sector productivity is going to increase permanently in one year by 1%. After a year, however, this news
turns out to be false.
Figure 5 depicts the dynamic response to this false news shock (solid line), together with a hypo-
thetical situation in which the news would be true (dashed line). In qualitative terms, this scenario
turns out to result in similar responses as the previous one. On impact, consumption and investment
start to rise. Output goes up as well, but not enough to satisfy the domestic demand, so the current
account turns negative. Increased demand pressures translate into higher inﬂation and the exchange
rate appreciates. Once the expectations turn out to be an illusion, the economic activity contracts,
inﬂation goes down and turns into deﬂation, and the exchange rate depreciates. There is also some
improvement in the current account balance, but it takes about another three and a half years before
it comes back to zero.
Finally, we brieﬂy describe the results for an analogous pair of misperception scenarios based on
productivity developments in the nontradable sector (not illustrated in ﬁgures). Confusing a transitory
shock with a permanent one turns out to lead to qualitatively similar dynamic responses of the key
real variables as it was the case with the shock originating from the tradable sector, except that the
correction following the turning point (i.e. when agents realize that they have been wrong) is more
gradual. Naturally, the response of inﬂation and the real exchange rate are of the opposite sign to
what we have seen before and also come back to their initial levels at a somewhat faster pace. Similar
observations can be made in the case of the false news shock, except that it fails to generate a boom-
bust cycle in investment. This is related to the initially negative response of investment following
expectations of future productivity improvements in the nontradable sector, the mechanics of which we18
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discussed before.
6 The role of alternative monetary regimes
In all scenarios described so far we have used our baseline parameterization of EAGLE, which models
a converging economy as a part of a common currency area. In this section we show how the responses
to our stylized scenarios change if we consider an alternative regime, in which our catching-up economy
follows a fully independent monetary policy, with a freely ﬂoating exchange rate. The parameterization
of the interest rate feedback rule is the same as for the other three regions of the world economy.
In this alternative variant, all structural parameters of the model are the same as in the baseline
monetary union case. In other words, our exercise just compares the impact of monetary regimes across
otherwise identical economies. Although in general DSGE models are considered to be much more
immune to the Lucas critique than less micro-founded approaches, one cannot completely rule out that
some of the parameters describing the optimization problems of economic agents are in fact endogenous
to the monetary regime. All our subsequent results should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
The dynamic responses of a set of key macrovariables to the ﬁve scenarios considered in section four
and ﬁve are plotted in ﬁgures 6 to 9, which correspond to ﬁgures 2 to 5 described before.18 The solid
lines replicate the monetary union case (our baseline), while the dashed lines illustrate the dynamic
responses under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
We start from our two real convergence scenarios, focusing ﬁrst on their baseline (anticipated)
variants. In the tradable sector productivity catching-up scenario, if the exchange rate is allowed
to ﬂoat, it appreciates signiﬁcantly on impact. The dynamic responses of output, consumption and
investment are smoother than it was the case in the monetary union setup. The initial deterioration
in the current account balance is also slightly more moderate, but then hardly distinguishable from the
union case. Most importantly, a relatively sharp appreciation of the nominal exchange rate virtually
allows to eliminate the surge in inﬂation, but then it somewhat increases, exceeding the target by more
than 0.2 percentage points for about a decade.19
To a large extent, an opposite picture emerges in the case of productivity catch-up in the nontradable
goods sector. In the free ﬂoat regime, the exchange rate depreciates sharply. The short-run response of
output and its expenditure components is less smooth and regular as in the monetary union case. The
nominal exchange rate depreciation and higher demand pressures actually lead to an increase rather
than a fall in inﬂation, which stays above the target for an extended period of time.
The unanticipated variants of the two real convergence scenarios lead to qualitatively similar conclu-
sions about the role of the monetary regime. The dynamic responses to the tradable sector productivity
catching-up and the foreign demand shift are smoother if the exchange rate is allowed to ﬂoat, while
the opposite holds true for the catching-up scenario in the nontradable sector.
Turning to the misperceptions about tradable sector productivity, one can note that a ﬂexible ex-
18Changing a monetary regime has no impact on the model’s steady-state equilibrium.
19Clearly, the dynamic response of inﬂation is highly dependent on the assumed monetary policy feedback rule, the
calibration of which relies on estimates obtained from models abstracting from real convergence processes. In reality, an
autonomous central bank seeing inﬂation above the target for an extended period of time would probably follow a more
restrictive line. This would make the diﬀerences across the monetary union and the ﬂexible exchange rate regime even
more pronounced. This remark also applies to other scenarios discussed in this section.19
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change rate tends to somewhat mitigate the boom-bust pattern in the response of output and private
demand components. This is also true for inﬂation, especially in the false news variant. The latter
feature can also be observed for a pair of related scenarios, based on nontradable productivity misper-
ceptions (not illustrated in ﬁgures). On the contrary, variables describing the real economic activity
display much more pronounced swings under a free ﬂoat than in the common currency case.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have used EAGLE, a multi-country DSGE model recently developed for the ESCB, to
analyze dynamic adjustments in a relatively small economy undergoing real convergence processes within
a monetary union. We considered a set of scenarios related to productivity catch-up and misperceptions
about productivity developments.
Our results indicate that even if real convergence takes the form of a gradual process, the dynamic
responses of key macrovariables can be far from smooth. Moreover, misperceptions about productivity
shifts can be an important source of cyclical deviations from a sustainable real convergence path. We ﬁnd
that if these processes are related to tradable sector developments or shifts in foreign preferences, keeping
the monetary autonomy helps to reduce the volatility of key macrovariables, especially of inﬂation, but
also (though to lesser extent) of output, consumption and investment. In contrast, being a part of a
monetary union seems to smooth developments originating from the nontradable sector.
As we have stressed, even though our quantitative results rely on a model that is calibrated with a
focus on the Spanish economy, our ﬁndings are aimed to be relevant for other countries, particularly for
the EU new member states from central and eastern Europe. All of them are relatively small economies
undergoing real convergence processes and some of them have been experiencing signiﬁcant boom-bust
cycles. These countries are also expected to join the euro area, and this will probably happen long
before real convergence processes become relatively less relevant for the policy makers. Given the main
patterns of real convergence observed in the new member states, i.e. rapid gains in tradable sector
productivity and strong export performance, our results suggest that entering the euro area (or the
ERM2 system) may be followed by an increase in volatility at an aggregate level, posing a challenge for
policy makers. Of course, being a member of the euro area is much more than just sharing a common
currency, so our results should not be interpreted as a suggestion that central and eastern European
countries would be better oﬀ sticking to their current currencies.
One can think about a number of potentially attractive avenues for further research on topics dis-
cussed in this paper. First and foremost, one has to bear in mind that our analysis is based on a
calibrated model. Given the large size of EAGLE and short time series available for countries where
real convergence processes are particularly relevant, having an estimated version of this model will not
be feasible in the near future. Therefore, while some preliminary robustness checks indicate that our
main results are not very sensitive in qualitative terms to varying the key model parameters within rea-
sonable bounds, it might be still useful to investigate this issue in more detail, including a recalibration
of the model to represent another current or prospective euro area member.20
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Tables and ﬁgures
Table 1. Steady state ratios
Spain REA USA RW
GDP share in world GDP 2.1 20.9 28.2 48.7
Consumption share in GDP 58.4 58.3 66.9 58.4
Government expenditures share in GDP 17.3 20.8 15.0 16.5
Investment share in GDP 24.3 20.9 18.1 25.1
Imported consumption goods share in GDP 9.9 7.3 4.8 4.0
Imported investment goods share in GDP 6.6 4.9 3.3 4.7
Net exports share in GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 2. Trade matrix - consumption goods imports
to - from Spain REA USA RW
Spain . 55.6 1.9 42.5
REA 12.3 . 4.8 82.9
USA 0.6 13.3 . 86.1
RW 4.8 52.1 43.1 .
Table 3. Trade matrix - investment goods imports
to - from Spain REA USA RW
Spain . 60.6 4.4 35.0
REA 5.1 . 13.6 81.3
USA 0.6 15.6 . 83.8
RW 1.9 37.6 60.5 .23
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Table 4. Final goods technology
Spain REA USA RW
Quasi-share of nontradables in ﬁnal consumption goods (%) 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0
Quasi-share of nontradables in ﬁnal investment goods (%) 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
Quasi-share of imports in tradable consumption goods (%) 62.1 47.7 24.6 25.2
Quasi-share of imports in tradable investment goods (%) 45.9 43.3 30.4 33.5
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and imports 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Elasticity of substitution between imported goods 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Table 5. Intermediate goods technology
Spain REA USA RW
Capital share in nontradable production 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.35
Capital share in tradable production 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.40
Elasticity of substitution between intermediate nontradable varieties 3.5 3.5 4.6 4.6
Elasticity of substitution between intermediate tradable varieties 5.8 5.8 7.7 7.7
Calvo probability for goods sold domestically 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Calvo probability for exported goods 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Price indexation 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Table 6. Households
Spain REA USA RW
Share of households with limited access to capital markets 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50
Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Habit persistence 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Inverse of the Elasticity of labour supply 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Elasticity of substitution between labour varieties 4.33 4.33 7.25 7.25
Calvo probability for wages 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Wage indexation 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Depreciation rate 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.02524
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Table 7. Fiscal authorities
Spain REA USA RW
Target government debt to quarterly GDP ratio 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
Response of lump sum taxes to deviation of public debt from target 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Consumption tax rate (%) 16.0 18.5 7.7 7.7
Personal income tax rate (%) 9.7 12.5 15.4 15.4
Social security contribution tax paid by employees (%) 4.9 12.5 7.1 7.1
Social security contribution tax paid by employers (%) 23.4 21.7 7.1 7.1
Table 8. Monetary authorities
Spain REA USA RW
Interest rate smoothing 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Long-run response of interest rates to inﬂation 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Long-run response of interest rates to output gap 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Table 9. Adjustment costs
Spain REA USA RW
Capacity utilization cost (second derivative) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Investment adjustment cost (second derivative) 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Import adjustment cost for consumption goods (second derivative) 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Import adjustment cost for investment goods (second derivative) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
International transaction cost (ﬁrst derivative in steady state) 0.01 0.01 . 0.0125
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Table 10. Long-run impact of real convergence scenarios
Productivity shock Productivity shock








Terms of trade 6.2 0.9
Real exchange rate -3.6 3.9
Internal exchange rate 8.3 -4.7
Hours worked -1.2 -1.0
Real wage rate 4.9 4.1
REA Output 0.0 0.0
REA Consumption 0.1 0.0
Notes: All variables reported as percentage deviations from their initial
steady-state levels.26
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Notes: The productivity gap is deﬁned as the percentage diﬀerence between gross value
added per hours worked in Spain and that in the rest of the euro area. Aggregation and
comparison is based on industry speciﬁc purchasing power parities. The tradable sector
comprises the following industries: agriculture (NACE A and B), mining and quarrying
(C) and manufacturing (D). The nontradable sector covers the rest of the market economy,
i.e. it excludes real estate activities (NACE 70) as well as community and social services
(L to O).
Source: Own calculations based on data from EU-KLEMS.27
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Notes: The solid (dashed) lines present the dynamic response to the fully anticipated (unanticipated) real
convergence scenario. The current account balance is expressed relative to nominal GDP and, together with
consumer price inﬂation and the short-term interest rate, reported as percentage point deviations from their
initial steady-state levels. All remaining variables are reported as percentage deviations.28
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0 4 8 1 21 62 02 42 83 23 64 0
Notes: The solid (dashed) lines present the dynamic response to the fully anticipated (unanticipated) real
convergence scenario. The current account balance is expressed relative to nominal GDP and, together with
consumer price inﬂation and the short-term interest rate, reported as percentage point deviations from their
initial steady-state levels. All remaining variables are reported as percentage deviations.29
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0 4 8 1 21 62 02 4
Notes: The solid lines present the dynamic response to the misperception scenario (i.e. confusing a transitory
shock with a permanent one), while the dashed lines show how the economy would evolve if the shock was
indeed permanent. The current account balance is expressed relative to nominal GDP and, together with
consumer price inﬂation and the short-term interest rate, reported as percentage point deviations from their
initial steady-state levels. All remaining variables are reported as percentage deviations.30
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048 1 2 1 6 2 0 2 4
Notes: The solid lines present the dynamic response to the false news scenario, while the dashed lines show
how the economy would evolve if the news was true. The current account balance is expressed relative
to nominal GDP and, together with consumer price inﬂation and the short-term interest rate, reported as
percentage point deviations from their initial steady-state levels. All remaining variables are reported as
percentage deviations.31
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0 4 8 1 21 62 02 42 83 23 64 0
Consumer price inflation
Notes: The solid lines illustrate the dynamic responses under the monetary union (our baseline speciﬁcation),
while the dashed lines show the ﬂexible exchange rate regime. The current account balance is expressed relative
to nominal GDP and, together with consumer price inﬂation and the short-term interest rate, reported as
percentage point deviations from their initial steady-state levels. All remaining variables are reported as
percentage deviations.32
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Consumer price inflation
Notes: The solid lines illustrate the dynamic responses under the monetary union (our baseline speciﬁcation),
while the dashed lines show the ﬂexible exchange rate regime. The current account balance is expressed relative to
nominal GDP and, together with consumer price inﬂation and the short-term interest rate, reported as percentage
point deviations from their initial steady-state levels. All remaining variables are reported as percentage deviations.33
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Consumer price inflation
Notes: The solid lines illustrate the dynamic responses under the monetary union (our baseline speciﬁcation),
while the dashed lines show the ﬂexible exchange rate regime. The current account balance is expressed relative
to nominal GDP and, together with consumer price inﬂation and the short-term interest rate, reported as
percentage point deviations from their initial steady-state levels. All remaining variables are reported as
percentage deviations.34
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1231
August 2010































































































048 1 2 1 6 2 0 2 4
Consumer price inflation
Notes: The solid lines illustrate the dynamic responses under the monetary union (our baseline speciﬁcation),
while the dashed lines show the ﬂexible exchange rate regime. The current account balance is expressed relative
to nominal GDP and, together with consumer price inﬂation and the short-term interest rate, reported as
percentage point deviations from their initial steady-state levels. All remaining variables are reported as
percentage deviations.Working PaPer SerieS
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